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THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS:
EFFECTIVE REMEDIES IN DOMESTIC LAW?
N E∗
I
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Charter), adopted
over two decades ago,1 entered into force on 21 October 1986. It made provision
for the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission),
which was established in 1987. The purpose of the Commission, according to
the Charter, is “to protect human and peoples’ rights and ensure their protection
in Africa”.2 But the Commission has not been able to discharge that oﬃce
satisfactorily. An important reason for the inability of the Commission to attain
its principal objective of protecting human rights in Africa is the fact that it has
no power to grant a remedy.3 It has no jurisdiction to make binding decisions
against state parties that have violated the provisions of the Charter. Once the
Commission reaches a decision on the merits of a case, its only jurisdiction is to
make recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
(AHSG) of the Organization of African Unity.4 But the AHSG itself cannot
make binding decisions against state parties. It can only decide to permit
publication of their violations.5 Therefore, under the African Charter, there is
currently no international institution that can make binding decisions against
states that have violated the provisions of the Charter. There is only a power to
publicize violations. Yet even this power is conferred not on the Commission
but on the AHSG, which is a political body. And that body, as one former
member of the Commission has put it, “consists of the very guilty parties”.6
Deprived then of the tools necessary to achieve its purpose of protecting human
rights in Africa, the Commission’s endeavours have been largely without any
real results.7 The consequence of all this is that under the system of the Charter
victims of human rights violations cannot get any adequate remedy (such as
monetary compensation) at the international level. This may be contrasted with
other regional systems such as the European Convention on Human Rights and
∗ University of Birmingham.
1 On 27 June 1981, at the 18th Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization
of African Unity (OAU).
2 Art. 30.
3 Other reasons include the lack of financial resources, lack of independence and the inability of
the Commission even to publicize its findings. See R. Murray, “Decisions of the African Commission
on individual communications under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (1997)
46 ICLQ 412, 414.
4 Art. 58.
5 Art. 59.
6 Ex-Commissioner Moleleki Mokama in C. Odinkalu, Interview with Moleleki Mokama, Interights,
1993, cited in Murray, op. cit., 414, n. 20.
7 This is the case in spite of what one writer has perceived as the Commission’s “dynamic and
courageous” attitude in recent years, given the political pressures under which it operates: Murray,
op. cit., 434.
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Fundamental Freedoms which has provision for a Human Rights Court with
jurisdiction to make binding decisions against contracting states.8
It is the Commission’s want of a power to give a proper remedy that has been
the justification for persistent calls for the establishment of an African Court of
Human Rights.9 Happily the African states have now recognized this serious
weakness in the African system and adopted, in 1998, a protocol to the Charter
for the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.10
However, in the meantime, unable to get any proper remedy at an international
level under the African system,11 victims of human rights violations in African
have been compelled to look to their national courts for redress. It is true that
in most cases the attempts to get redress in national courts have failed largely
because in many, though not all, African countries the judiciary is anything but
independent. African judges for the most part tread extremely carefully when
invited to grant relief against public authorities or even to hold that there has
been a violation of human rights by the administration. Yet once in a while a
national judge somewhere will put his or her head above the parapet by
condemning violations of human rights by the executive and granting the victim
a remedy. Although courageous and bold judges of this kind are in a tiny
minority, there is reason for suspecting that this minority is growing gradually.12
Included in this rising tide of judicial protection of human rights in Africa is the
recent decision of a Cameroonian Magistrate in The People v. Nya Henry &
4 Ors,13 a case which concerned the violation of the right to the presumption of
innocence by the department in charge of public prosecutions.
This article examines, in the light of the decision in that case, the scope of
the right to the presumption of innocence under the African Charter. It also
explores the remedies available under national law in Cameroon for the violation
of human rights under the Charter.
T R   P  I  C
A person charged with a criminal oﬀence has the right to be presumed
innocent until he or she is proved guilty according to law. Widely recognized as
a fundamental human right, this right to the presumption of innocence is
8 Art. 41.
9 E.g. E. Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and Procedures,
London, 1996, 75.
10 Adopted at the 34th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, soon to become
the African Union.
11 There are of course other avenues of redress at an international level, but these are separate
from the regime of the African Charter. For example, individual complaints may be made to the
UN Human Rights Committee where a right under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights is alleged to have been violated. Individual complaints are allowed under the First Optional
Protocol to the Covenant. Indeed in 1994 Albert Mukong, a writer and human rights activist, took
his case to the Committee which ruled that his rights to liberty, security of person and freedom of
expression had been violated. The Committee recommended that he be compensated. In June 2001
the Cameroon Government reportedly paid Mukong $137,000 compensation.
12 A notable example is the decision of Judge Kandji of Senegal (in February 2000) to indict
Hissene Habre´, the former Head of State of Chad, on charges of accomplice to torture, even though
political interference with the judicial process might have resulted in the indictments being subsequently
dismissed on appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. See I. Sansani, “The Pinochet precedent
in Africa: prosecution of Hissene Habre´” Human Rights Brief (2001), 32.
13 Suit No. BA/236c/01-02, Court of First Instance, Bamenda (29 October 2001). I am grateful
to Professor C.N. Ngwasiri for making a copy of this judgment available to me.
Vol. 46, No. 2 African Charter on Rights 199
proclaimed in article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,14
embedded in article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights15 and
enshrined in article 7(1)(b) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights.16 It is beyond doubt that this right is recognized by the Constitution and
laws of the Republic of Cameroon. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, which contains the right to the presumption of innocence, was ratified
by Cameroon in 1987,17 with the result that its provisions, including article
7(1)(b), have the force of law in Cameroon.18 Indeed, in the preamble of the
Cameroon Constitution19 it is recorded that the people of Cameroon “Aﬃrm our
attachment to the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, . . . the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”,20
and, in particular, to a list of principles, one of which is the principle that “every
accused person is presumed innocent until found guilty during a hearing
conducted in strict compliance with the rights of defence”.21 Although there is
no doubt that the right to the presumption of innocence is recognized under
the Cameroon Constitution there may be some diﬃculty in identifying the limits
of the right and, where there has been an infringement of it, finding an eﬀective
and practical remedy.
These issues presented themselves recently in The People v. Nya Henry & 4
Ors.22 The facts of the case are in a narrow compass. Following some public
disturbances,23 the defendants, together with many others, were arrested on 1
October 2001. By a motion on notice, the defendants with 14 others applied to
the court for an order admitting them to bail pending the preferment of any
charges against them. In a ruling of 24 October 2001, in Dr Luma & 18 Ors v.
The People,24 a magistrate (Kalla Abednego) granted bail to all 19 applicants and
14 Art. 11(1): “Everyone charged with a penal oﬀence has the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for
his defence.”
15 Art. 6(2): “Everyone charged with a criminal oﬀence shall be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law.”
16 Art. 7(1) reads “Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises
. . . (b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal.”
17 Decree No. 87-1910 of 29 December 1987, authorized by Law No. 87-29 of 17 December
1987.
18 Under Art. 45 of the Cameroon Constitution, duly ratified international agreements not only
have the force of law but override domestic law.
19 As amended in 1996 by Law No. 96-06 of January 1996.
20 Emphasis in the original.
21 Art. 65 of the Cameroon Constitution makes it clear that the Preamble is “part and parcel”
of the Constitution.
22 See n. 13 above.
23 These were the result of political agitation, a brief background to which may be helpful. The
current Republic of Cameroon is a union of the former UN Trust territory under British administration
(commonly known as British Southern Cameroons) and the former UN Trust territory under French
administration (at that time known as French Cameroon). French Cameroon gained independence
from France in 1960 and became the Republic of Cameroon. On 1 October 1961 British Southern
Cameroons also gained independence by joining French Cameroon in a union known as the Federal
Republic of Cameroon. Through various developments, the unified country has come to be called
the Republic of Cameroon. For some years now, a movement widely known as the Southern
Cameroon National Council (SCNC) has been advocating for the independence of Southern
Cameroon from the union. On 1 October 2001 the SCNC brought crowds of people out in certain
towns within Southern Cameroon to celebrate the “independence” that they desire; 1 October being
the day in 1961 when Southern Cameroon gained its independence from the United Kingdom. The
SCNC demonstrations went ahead in spite of a prefectorial order banning them. The demonstrators
clashed with the police and other armed forces. In the crackdown that followed, a number of persons,
including the defendants in the present case, were arrested and detained.
24 No. BA/13m/01-02, Court of First Instance, Bamenda.
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ordered their release from detention. But, in breach of the court order, the five
defendants were not released. Instead on 29 October they were brought before
the same magistrate charged with two oﬀences: (i) violation of a prefectorial
order (a simple oﬀence25) and (ii) unlawful assembly26 (a misdemeanor). The
question then arose whether, by their continued detention in breach of the bail
order, there had been a violation of the defendants’ right to the presumption of
innocence. It was found as a fact that the reason why the defendants had not
been released as ordered was because the Procureur General of the North West
Province,27 the most senior oﬃcial in charge of public prosecutions in the
province, had given instructions that they should not be released as ordered by
the court. That being the case, the remaining question was whether, by preventing
the release of the defendants as ordered, the Procureur General had violated
their right to the presumption of innocence. The court answered that question
in the aﬃrmative. Magistrate Abednego expressed himself in unmistakable terms:
“My answer to that question is that by refusing to carry out the order of the court
releasing them [the defendants] on bail, these people [the defendants] have been
brought before me as people presumed guilty that I must convict. This makes me
conclude that the constitutional right of the defendants of presumption of innocence
has been violated.”
Was the magistrate correct to hold that there had been a violation of the
defendants’ right to the presumption of innocence? To answer this question it
is necessary to consider the scope of the right to the presumption of innocence
under the African Charter.
S   R   P  I
Judicial authorities
It is commonplace that the right to the presumption of innocence is in essence
a procedural safeguard in criminal proceedings and is therefore an element of
the right to a fair trial.28 Hence violations of this right are most likely to occur
in criminal proceedings where the judge regards the defendant as guilty before
the trial. For example, in a number of cases before the African Commission on
Human Rights,29 it was alleged that the courts in Malawi30 adopted a theory
that “there is no smoke without fire”. In other words, the mere fact that a person
has been charged is regarded by the court as an indication that the person has
done something wrong. This is in eﬀect a presumption of guilt, which is directly
contrary to the right to the presumption of innocence. And a judge who adopts
25 Punishable under section R. 370(12) of the Cameroon Penal Code, with a maximum penalty
of CFA 25,000 (roughly £25) and/or 10 days’ imprisonment. In the magistrate’s ruling the provision
of the Penal Code is typed as “section K. 370(11)”, but that must be an error.
26 Punishable under s. 231(1) of the Penal Code with a maximum penalty of six months’
imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 CFA (about £100).
27 Cameroon is divided administratively into ten provinces, each with a Governor (the highest
administrative oﬃcer), a Court of Appeal (the highest court in a province) and a Procureur General
(the highest oﬃcer in charge of public prosecutions in a province).
28 In the European Convention of Human Rights, for example, the right to the presumption of
innocence appears in art. 6 dealing with the right to a fair trial. Similarly in the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the right to the presumption of innocence, is to be found in art. 7
which deals with the right of every individual to have his or her cause heard.
29 Chiume and African Watch v. Malawi, 7th Activity Report, cited in Ankumah, op. cit., 68.
30 Before the election of a new Government in 1994.
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such a theory clearly violates the defendant’s right to the presumption of
innocence.
Since the right to the presumption of innocence appears to be directed chiefly
against judicial authorities, it was at one time assumed that the principle of
presumption of innocence imposes obligations only on judicial authorities, and
therefore could be shown to have been violated only where, at the conclusion
of proceedings ending in a conviction, the court’s reasoning is seen to suggest
that it regarded the defendant as guilty in advance.31 But the fallacy of such a
restrictive view of the scope of the principle has been exposed in the European
Court of Human Rights (the European Court).
The European Court has taken the view that the principle of the presumption
of innocence is not limited to cases where the proceedings result in a conviction.32
Moreover, that court has also made it clear that the right to the presumption
of innocence may be violated not only by a judge or court but also by other
public authorities, such as the police, the department in charge of public
prosecutions and even the Minister of Justice.33 In Allenet de Ribemont v. France,34
for example, M. Allenet de Ribemont had been arrested as part of an investigation
into the murder of a member of parliament. The French Minister of Interior,
the police superintendent in charge of the inquiry and the Director of the
Criminal Investigation Department all made remarks at a press conference
referring to M. de Ribemont as one of the instigators of the murder and thus
an accomplice. The European Court held that these remarks were a declaration
of M. de Ribemont’s guilt before trial and that this was a breach of his right to
the presumption of innocence.
It may be asked whether the interpretation of the scope of the right to the
presumption of innocence by the European Court is relevant to the interpretation
of the equivalent provision of the African Charter. It is submitted that it is.
Under article 60 of the Charter, the Commission, the body charged with the
responsibility of interpreting the provisions of the Charter,35 is required to draw
inspiration from international law on human rights. There is some evidence that
the African Commission “attempts to draw inspiration from the practice of other
human rights bodies”,36 including the practice of the European Commission and
European Court of Human Rights.37 It is not too much to say therefore that
under the African Charter, and therefore under the law in Cameroon, obligations
imposed by the principle of the presumption of innocence extend to public
authorities such as the Procureur General, described by the magistrate in the
Nya Henry case as “the highest oﬃcer I know to be in charge of public prosecutions
in this province”.
31 This was the argument advanced by the French Government before the European Court of
Human Rights in Allenet de Ribemont v. France (1995) 20 EHRR 557, para. 32.
32 The European Court has found violations of the right to a presumption of innocence in cases
where the defendant had been acquitted at the end of the proceedings (e.g. Sekanina v. Austria (1993)
Series A no. 266-A) or where, for some reason, the proceedings were discontinued and the defendant
was discharged (e.g. Minelli v. Switzerland (1983) 5 EHRR 554, Allenet de Ribemont v. France.
33 Allenet de Ribemont v. France.
34 Ibid.
35 Art. 45(3).
36 Ankumah, op. cit., 74.
37 Cf. Ibid., 131.
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Unlawful detention?
Even if a violation of the right to the presumption of innocence may be
committed by a public oﬃcial such as the Procureur General, the separate
question remains of whether the unlawful detention of an accused could amount
to such a violation. The answer, it is submitted, must be in the aﬃrmative. If
mere words by public authorities could amount to a breach of the right to the
presumption of innocence, as in the Allenet de Ribemont case, then it is not diﬃcult
to see how continued detention in defiance of a court order would make a
stronger case for finding a violation of the right. After all actions speak louder
than words. And in Cameroon in particular it is common knowledge that pre-
trial detention is widely used as an instrument of punishment. Thus after his
visit to Cameroon in 1999, the UN Special Rapporteur, Sir Nigel Rodley,
concluded in his report that “pre-trial detention is used not to attain its primary
goal of upholding order and security and facilitating investigations, but rather,
in the perception both of the public and forces of law and order, as a sanction.”38 Against
that background, it is easy to see how the determination of the prosecuting
authorities to keep the defendants in pre-trial detention even against an order
of the court amounts to a presumption of guilt.
Yet it should not be supposed that every pre-trial detention which is unlawful
will amount to a violation of the right to the presumption of innocence. Thus
where the unlawfulness of the detention was unintentional there may be no such
breach. This will be the case, for example, where the detention of a person is
unlawful because the arrest warrant was defective in that the police mistakenly
failed to comply with a certain formality. In such a case, the unlawfulness of the
detention is unintentional and may be due either to negligence or to an excess
of enthusiasm on the part of an oﬃcial. The important point is that it is not the
result of a conscious intent to treat the accused as guilty. Such a situation is
diﬀerent from a case, such as Nya Henry, where the unlawfulness of the detention
is the result of a conscious intent to flout an order of the court admitting the
defendant to bail. It is this deliberate act, to treat the defendant as a guilty
person, in the face of a court decision that he or she should be presumed
innocent that amounts to a clear violation of the right to the presumption of
innocence. Therefore, it is respectfully suggested that the Cameroonian court
was right to find that there had been a violation of the defendants’ right to the
presumption of innocence.
Of course it is possible that the unlawful detention may also amount to the
violation of a separate right enshrined in the African Charter, such as the right
to liberty and the right not to be arbitrarily detained.39 Few would deny that
during the period that the five defendants were detained in violation of a court
order for their release, they were deprived of their freedom for no lawful reason.
And there is little doubt that their continued detention without lawful reason
makes the detention arbitrary, and therefore unlawful under article 6 of the
38 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Sir Nigel Rodley, submitted pursuant to UN Commission
on Human Rights resolution 1998/38 (E/CN.4/2000/9/Add.2), para 53. Emphasis added. The
problem of pre-trial detention is serious. The same report states (at para. 52) that “80 per cent of
the current prison population of Cameroon consists of untried prisoners.”
39 Under art. 6 of the Charter which reads: “Every individual shall have the right to liberty and
to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and
conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.”
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African Charter. In most cases an individual’s right to liberty is infringed when
he or she is detained at a police station beyond the time permitted by law, so
that the detention beyond the permitted time becomes unlawful detention. In
such cases it is possible to argue that the police or the relevant administrative
authority violates the law unintentionally. The Cameroonian case under
discussion is spectacular but, sadly, not unique, in that the violation occurs in
the face of a court order.40 In any event, where there is a breach of a Charter
right the question will arise whether there is an adequate remedy under national
law.
I T  E R?
Under traditional jurisdiction
The question of a remedy is of course very important because without an
eﬀective remedy a right is largely worthless. The African Charter envisages that
each State party shall take legislative or other measures to give eﬀect to the
rights guaranteed by the Charter.41 In the case of Cameroon, the principal
measure which has been adopted is the establishment of a National Committee
of Human Rights and Freedoms.42 But the Cameroon Committee is no more
eﬀective in providing a remedy than the African Commission. It has only a
reporting role,43 it is seriously under-funded, and is not seen to be independent
of political influence.44 The result is that under national law in Cameroon those
who allege infringements of their Charter rights have little choice but to turn to
the courts for protection. Do the courts in Cameroon have powers to give a
remedy for the breach of a Charter right? The first point to note is that the
Charter has been ratified by Cameroon. Under the Constitution, the Charter
has the force of law in Cameroon by virtue of ratification. Indeed where there
is a conflict between a provision of the Charter and national legislation the
provision of the Charter prevails.45 It follows that a breach of a Charter provision
is a breach of Cameroonian law and must be treated as such by domestic courts.
Consequently, the courts can use their existing powers to give relief where there
is a violation of a Charter right in the same way as they can give relief where
there is a breach of some other national legislation. Domestic courts in Cameroon
need not wait for a special legislative measure giving them additional powers to
grant remedies for violations of Charter rights. This, I think, is widely recognized,
40 This is not the first time that the administrative authorities in Cameroon have blatantly ignored
a court order that they do not like. In Benjamin Itoe v. Joseph Ncho (No. BCA/1/81), unreported, for
example, where the Procureur General had ignored a court order, the Bamenda Court of Appeal,
lamented that a tendence on the part of the administrative authorities towards disobedience of court
orders was “gaining ground”. The pattern continued unabated, especially in high profile cases. Thus
the order of the High Court of Bamenda in Wakai v. The People (1997) 1 CCLR 127 for the release
of the applicants was ignored by the authorities who, after the order, simply removed the applicants
from the common law jurisdiction of Bamenda to the civil law jurisdiction in Yaounde where their
unlawful detention continued.
41 See art. 62.
42 Established by Decree No. 90/1450 of 8 November 1990.
43 It only receives allegations of human rights violations and reports them to the President of the
Republic and to other competent authorities. Its mandate allows it to visit detention units and to
propose human rights measures to public authorities and to organize training programmes.
44 The Committee is chaired by a former minister of the present regime, the state prosecutor of
the Supreme Court is a member. And the Committee’s activities are of a confidential nature and
its reports and recommendations are made available only to the relevant public authorities.
45 Art. 45 of the Constitution.
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and it has never seriously been suggested that if one individual commits a breach
of another’s Charter right the court will refuse to grant a remedy. The problem
is that very often the breach which cries out for a remedy is not a breach
committed by a private individual against another; in most cases the alleged
violation is by a public authority or the administration. The diﬃculty here is
that cases involving the administration do give rise to a question of jurisdiction.
This is because in Cameroon there is a divide between administrative courts
and ordinary courts, each with its own separate jurisdiction.
Administrative courts or ordinary courts?
Since in most cases complaints of human rights abuse are made against
public authorities, it is an important question whether the ordinary courts have
jursidiction to give a remedy against a public authority or the administration.
In most common law systems the problem really does not arise because the
ordinary courts normally have such jurisdiction. In the case of Cameroon the
position is diﬀerent in that it has adopted the French system of separate
administrative courts which exercise judicial control of the administration.
According to this divide, ordinary courts do not in general have jurisdiction in
administrative disputes. Therefore an individual seeking a remedy for a violation
of a Charter right alleged to have been committed by someone who claims to
have been acting in his or her administrative capacity will need to consider
carefully whether the claim is properly one for the administrative courts or the
ordinary courts.
Administrative courts
In Cameroon, under section 9(1) of a 1972 Ordinance46 only an administrative
court has jurisdiction in cases of administrative disputes against the State, public
authorities and public corporations. Administrative disputes in this context
include actions for damages for loss caused by an administrative act.47 Therefore
if a complainant suﬀers loss as a result of an administrative act which is in
violation of the Charter, a claim for damages may be commenced in an
administrative court. It may be that this approach towards controlling the
administration and protecting human rights through special administrative courts
is one which is in principle as good as any other. But in practice, in the
Cameroonian context, it is less than ideal. This is because there is currently only
one administrative court in Cameroon, the Administrative Bench of the Supreme
Court,48 and it is located in the capital city, Yaounde, which is somewhat distant
from many parts of the country, especially considering the less than perfect roads
and other transport infrastructure. The consequence is that few can aﬀord the
expense and trouble necessary to take complaints of human rights violations to
46 S. 9(1) of Ordinance No. 72/6 of 26 August 1972 fixing the Organization of the Supreme
Court, as amended.
47 Ibid. s. 9(2)(b).
48 Art. 32(3) of the 1972 Constitution. The position will be diﬀerent when art. 40 of the 1996
Constitution enters into force. Under this article the Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court
will have jurisdiction to hear appeals from lower courts in “cases of administrative disputes”. This
provision envisages that there will be lower courts with jurisdiction over cases of administrative
disputes. It is not clear whether it is intended that the lower courts in question should be special
administrative courts, as in France, or whether the ordinary courts will simply be given new
jurisdiction over administrative disputes.
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the Supreme Court.49 And since that court is the only court with jurisdiction to
give a remedy, those who cannot obtain access to the court are left without a
remedy. Hence the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in such cases is
an obstacle to the eﬀective protection of human rights in Cameroon.
Ordinary courts
As a result of the practical diﬃculties of accessing the Administrative Bench
of the Supreme Court, it is often in the interest of many claimants to seek a
remedy from the ordinary courts (Court of First Instance and High Court) which
are more readily accessible at a local level. In this respect, the more the ordinary
courts can intervene, the more accessible the remedy and the more eﬀective the
protection of human rights. However, for the ordinary court to assume
jurisdiction, the claimant needs to show that the claim is one within the jurisdiction
of the ordinary courts. The key question then is this, to what extent do the
ordinary courts have jurisdiction in cases where the alleged violation involved
an action by a public authority?
At one time the view gained currency that as the legislative provisions
give the Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court jurisdiction in cases of
administrative disputes, the ordinary courts in Cameroon therefore lack
jurisdiction in any case involving any action taken by the administration. It was
assumed that a person who alleges that his or her human rights had been violated
by a public authority could not obtain a remedy from the ordinary courts; he
or she had to go to the Supreme Court. It is stated in one text,50 for example,
that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide all administrative cases. And
it is then stated that administrative litigation includes disputes concerning “any
arbitrary step by the administration against liberty and property”.51
Yet it is not correct to say that the ordinary courts do not have jurisdiction
in some matters involving action taken by the administration. Section 9(4) of the
Ordinance of 1972 clearly specifies such instances. These include cases of (i)
trespass and (ii) arbitrary action (or voies de fait) by the administration. The same
provision even goes on to stipulate that in such cases the ordinary court has
jurisdiction to order any measure to put an end to the impugned action by the
administration. So, if a public authority trespasses on to a person’s private
property the ordinary courts have jurisdiction under section 9(4) to grant a
remedy. There seems no reason why, if the administrative trespass is such that
it violates a right under the Charter (such as the right to property), the victim
of that breach of a Charter right should not be able to commence proceedings
in the ordinary court for a remedy. And an ordinary court dealing with such a
case can grant such remedy as may be necessry to put an end to the violation.
Although section 9(4) does not mention damages specifically, there seems no
reason why damages should not form part of the measures which may be ordered
by the court. Therefore it is submitted that under that section the ordinary
courts in Cameroon have jurisdiction to grant a remedy against the administration
where there has been a violation of the claimant’s Charter right as a result of
administrative trespass on the claimant’s private property. The problem with
49 One only needs to think of the expense and practical diﬃculties faced by a citizen in a small
town far removed from Yaounde to see why few bothers to pursue such claims.
50 C. Anyangwe, The Cameroonian Judicial System, Yaounde, 1987, 171.
51 Ibid.
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this remedy is that it applies only in this limited context and will not be available
in the absence of administrative trespass, except where the action in question is
so irregular or arbitrary as to bring the doctrine of voies de fait into play.
The doctrine of voies de fait is borrowed from French administrative law.52
Basically, it applies where an action by a public authority is so arbitrary or
irregular that it loses its character as an administrative act and consequently is
treated as if it were the act of a private body, and therefore may be adjudicated
upon by the ordinary courts, rather than the administrative courts. In Cameroon
the doctrine has been embedded in statute under section 9(4) of the 1972
Ordinance. This enactment of the doctrine is a positive step which clearly gives
the ordinary courts jurisdiction to entertain claims in cases involving action by
public authorities.53 Indeed the view that the ordinary courts have jurisdiction
in cases of voies de fait has been confirmed by the Supreme Court54 and applied
in many cases by the Court of Appeal55 and High Court.56 When an ordinary
court assumes jurisdiction under the voies de fait principle, it can grant any remedy
which is normally within its powers. It is submitted that this jurisdiction could,
and should, be exercised so as to give remedies, in appropriate cases, where
there has been a violation of a claimant’s human rights under the Charter.
If a court has jurisdiction to deal with a breach of the Charter, whether the
jurisdiction is under the doctrine of voies de fait or not, the question will arise:
what is the practical and eﬀective remedy for the breach? In the case of the
right to the presumption of innocence, the eﬀectiveness of the remedies within
the existing powers of the domestic courts will depend on whether the violation
is established before, during or after the criminal trial.
Where the breach is established before a trial
There are certain situations in which an individual’s right under the Charter
may be infringed by the action of a person or authority that is not related to
any prospective prosecution at all. In such cases the complainant is entitled to
seek immediate relief from the High Court. The relief may take the form of an
injunction or an award of damages. If, for example, there is a breach of article
6 of the Charter in that a person is detained or imprisoned without lawful
excuse, the High Court in Cameroon has jurisdiction57 to grant an order for the
immediate release of the individual. In Richard Tikum v. Ngwan Mbanyamsick,58 for
example, the High Court granted injunctive relief against a traditional ruler
whose actions were found to be in breach of the applicant’s fundamental human
52 For a good discussion of the doctrine in English, see, L. Neville Brown and John Bell, French
Administrative Law, 5th ed., Oxford, 1998, 139–140.
53 It has been held (Wakai v. The People (1997) 1 CCLR 127) that the fact that the impugned
action was purportedly taken under emergency laws does not exclude the jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts based on the doctrine of voie de fait.
54 E.g. John Enoh v. Zachary Abe Tatah: No. 26/78/79/cc, especially the report of the conseiller/
rapporteur. Even before the 1972 Ordinance, the doctrine of voies de fait had been recognized in
Cameroon by the decision of the Full Bench of the Federal Supreme Court, as it then was, in Nve
Ndongo’s case: No. 10 of 17 October 1968.
55 E.g. the Bamenda Court of Appeal in Joseph Ncho v. Benjamin Itoe: No. BCA/1/81 ( judgment
13 July 1981 unreported).
56 Most notably in the celebrated case of Wakai v. The People (1997) 1 CCLR 127.
57 S. 16 of Law No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972 as amended by Law No. 89/019 of 29 December
1989.
58 High Court of Mbengui, Suit No. MBHC/17M/2000, unreported, but noted (2001) Juridis
Pe´riodique 31, by Simon Tabe Tabe.
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rights of freedom of association59 and the right to property.60 In that case the
action which was found to be in breach of the Charter was completely unrelated
to any criminal investigations or trial. But in other, perhaps most, cases, the
conduct in breach of the Charter would be conduct on the part of the police or
other prosecuting authority in connection with a criminal investigation or trial.
In such a case the complainant can also commence proceedings in the High
Court even before he or she is charged with any oﬀence at all. If, in such
proceedings, the court finds that there has been a breach of the Charter, it can
give a remedy even before the complainant has been charged with any oﬀence.
The case of Wakai & 172 Ors v. The People61 is an example of how such a remedy
is possible under existing law in Cameroon. Following the proclamation of the
results of Presidential elections of 11 October 1992 there was widespread unrest
involving the destruction of property and loss of lives in the North West Province
and in Bamenda in particular.62 To impose calm and order, a state of emergency
was declared in Bamenda and a number of people were arrested and detained
under emergency legislation.63 The applicants (173 in number) were amongst
those arrested and detained. Even before they were charged with any oﬀence,
the applicants applied to the High Court for bail and for any other order which
the court deemed fit to make. Under the relevant legislation, the detention could
only be eﬀected on the order of specified administrative oﬃcials.64 However, the
names of 38 of the applicants did not even appear on any of the detention
orders. The High Court of Bamenda held that the continued detention of these
38 applicants was unlawful. By way of remedy the court ordered their immediate
release, not on bail, but “as of right”.65
Another remedy which may be granted by the ordinary courts is an award
of damages. In cases where the ordinary court assumes jurisdiction under the
doctrine of voies de fait the damages may be awarded against the public oﬃcial
in his personal capacity, since the action in question is ex hypothesi not an
administrative act. In John Enoh v. Zachary Abe Tatah66 the learned Conseiller/
Rapporteur of the Supreme Court made it clear that in cases where the action
of a public oﬃcial was so irregular as to attract the doctrine of voies de fait, the
public oﬃcial “becomes personally liable if his illegal acts cause damage to an
individual who should file his action not in the Administrative Bench of the
Supreme Court but in the ordinary civil courts”.67
This principle was applied in Benjamin Itoe v. Joseph Ncho.68 The two defendants
held public oﬃces. The first defendant was the Procureur General of the North
59 Art. 10(1) of the Charter.
60 Art. 14 of the Charter.
61 (1997) 1 CCLR 127.
62 Bamenda is the capital town of the North West Province and the residence of John Fru Ndi,
the main opposition candidate for the post of President of the Republic. Hence the serious nature
of the disturbances in the town when it was announced on state media that the incumbent, Paul
Biya, was the winner of the presidential elections.
63 Law No. 90/47 of 19 December 1990.
64 That is to say, in ascending order of rank, the Prefect of an Administrative Division, the
Governor of a Province, or the Minister of Territorial Administration.
65 The rest of the defendants were released on bail. But the administration, in characteristic
fashion, defied the court order and transferred the defendants from the North West Province in
Anglophone (common law) Cameroon to a prison in the Centre Province in Francophone (civil law)
Cameroon.
66 No. 26/78/79/cc, cited in Benjamin Itoe v. Joseph Ncho: No. BCA/1/81, unreported.
67 Emphasis in the original.
68 No. BCA/1/81 ( judgment 13 July 1981, unreported).
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West Province and the second defendant was the Commissioner of Police in
Bamenda, the capital town of the province. The defendants, purporting to be
acting in their oﬃcial capacities, trespassed on to the claimant’s premises,
ransacked his home and took away property. They detained the claimant’s
property, including a commercial vehicle (a petrol tanker) for months. The High
Court granted an order for the release of the vehicle. But the defendants
contemptuously ignored the court order. The claimant then commenced
proceedings before the High Court claiming damages against the defendants in
their personal capacities. The High Court awarded substantial damages against
the defendants personally. The defendants’ argument that their acts, which
constituted the claimant’s cause of action, were administrative and therefore the
proper court was the Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court and not the
ordinary courts, was rejected by the High Court and the Bamenda Court of
Appeal. The Court of Appeal examined the actions of the defendants and held
that they “were unambiguously arbitrary steps against the liberty and property”
of the claimant, so that the ordinary courts had jurisdiction under the doctrine
of voies de fait as enshrined in section 9(4) of the 1972 Ordinance.
The court went on to say that even if the defendants’ original acts were not
arbitrary, their continued acts in defiance of a court order were clearly illegal
and arbitrary and therefore attracted the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. It
is diﬃcult to disagree with this view. Action by a public oﬃcial which blatantly
disregards a court order is an action which certainly involves flagrant irregularity.
But the situation is worse where the action in contemptuous disregard of a court
order is that of public oﬃcials whose duty it is to enforce the observance of the
law. In such a case it is clear that the irregularity is both flagrant and gross and
is therefore bound to attract the doctrine of voies de fait. It is not diﬃcult to see
how the remedy granted in this case (damages) could be awarded in cases where
the arbitrary or illegal act is one which violates a claimant’s fundamental right
under the Charter.
In cases where the right infringed is the right to the presumption of innocence,
it is a diﬃcult question what the just and appropriate remedy should be where
a court determines that there has been a violation before any criminal trial.
Injunctive relief will only stop the breach from continuing. It will not compensate
for the wrong already done. Damages may provide some compensation but how,
it may be asked, can damages adequately compensate for any violation to the
complainant’s right to a fair trial which the breach of the right to the presumption
of innocence might have occasioned?69 This problem was highlighted in the
opinion of the dissenting judge in the Allenet de Ribemont case. He considered that
if the violation of the right to the presumption of innocence by a public authority
is established before the trial of the complainant, no practical and eﬀective
remedy can be aﬀorded for the violation. It is true that there is a problem in
such a case, but the problem of lack of eﬀective remedy for a violation established
before trial can be over-estimated. In the context of the European Convention,
if the violation (under article 6(2)) is not so serious that it is bound to involve a
breach of the right to a fair trial (under article 6(1)) then damages may be an
adequate remedy. In other words, the breach of the right to the presumption of
innocence does not necessarily involve a breach of the right to a fair trial. But
under the African Charter a similar distinction is not made. The fair trial right
69 Assuming of course that the complainant will subsequently be tried.
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in article 7(1) for an individual to have his or her cause heard comprises, inter
alia, the right to the presumption of innocence (article 7(1)(b)). Therefore, it is
submitted, any violation of the right to the presumption of innocence under sub-
paragraph (b) of article 7(1) is a violation of the right to have one’s cause heard
under article 7(1). If this is right, then in the context of Cameroon, the diﬃculties
involved in allowing a trial subsequently to proceed are greater. It may be that
in such a case the High Court hearing the complaint of violation of the right to
the presumption of innocence can, in exercise of its existing powers,70 issue an
order restraining the department of public prosecutions from proceeding with
the particular prosecution connected with the established violations.71 Even if it
is doubtful whether the existing jurisdiction of the High Court to grant an order
of prohibition under section 16 of the Law of 197272 extends to such a case, it
is submitted that the High Court has jurisdiction under section 9(4) of the 1972
Ordinance to grant such an order as a necessary measure to put an end to the
violation.
Where the violation is found during a criminal trial
In certain cases, as indeed in Nye Henry, claims of human rights violations will
be raised in connection with criminal proceedings. In such cases the appropriate
remedy may be obtained from the criminal court or through separate proceedings
before some other court.
Remedies which may be granted by the criminal court
In Cameroon it is generally accepted that persons who claim that a public
authority has violated their human rights under the African Charter may rely
on the infringement in any criminal proceedings against them. The only real
question is as to the remedies which a criminal court is able to grant in such
cases. There appears to be no specific statutory provision which sets out the
relief which may be granted by a criminal court for breach of the Charter. But
it is not too much to say that the court should be able to grant such remedy as
it considers just and appropriate, provided that the remedy or relief is within its
powers.73 It is commonplace that in criminal proceedings the courts in Cameroon
(Court of First Instance and High Court)74 have the power (i) to dismiss a
complaint “on the merits”, which has the eﬀect of an acquittal,75 (ii) to dismiss
a complaint “not on the merits” or “without prejudice”, which does not have
the eﬀect of an acquittal,76 (iii) to discharge the accused on the ground that there
70 S. 16(g) of Law No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972, as amended by Law No. 89/019 of 29 December
1989.
71 Whether every breach of the right under art. 7(1) of the Charter should give rise to the right
to have the trial discontinued is another matter. Even if one takes the view that there are degrees
of breaches of art. 7(1) so that the remedy being discussed in the text should be available only in
cases of a serious breach, the question remains whether the High Court has powers to issue an order
restraining the department in charge of public prosecutions from instituting a prosecution before
the defendant is charged.
72 Ibid.
73 In the UK s. 8(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 is to the same eﬀect.
74 Ss. 13 and 15 of Law No. 72/4 of 26 August 1972 as amended by Law No. 89/019 of 29
December 1989.
75 Criminal Procedure Ordinance, s. 301(1).
76 Ibid. s. 301(2).
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is no case to answer,77 (iv) to exclude evidence,78 or even (v) to reflect the breach
in the sentence which is imposed.
In The People v. Nye Henry the magistrate decided that the appropriate remedy
was to dismiss the complaint on the merits. The words of the magistrate merit
quotation in full:
“[T]he principle of law which I now adumbrate is that—and who says African
Magistrates cannot do this—where a court of competent jurisdiction in a criminal
matter orders the release of a defendant on bail and the department in charge of
public prosecutions—in our case the Legal Department—refuses to carry out that
order, the obvious conclusion is that the defendant has been denied the right of
presumption of innocence and the proper course for that court is to set the
defendant free.”
Is this remedy the most appropriate one in the circumstances of this case? It is
submitted that the answer to that question is in the aﬃrmative. All the other
remedies are either unsuitable or ineﬀective in the circumstances of the case.
First, there is no question of the exclusion of evidence. It simply does not arise
in this case. Secondly, there is also no question of discharging the defendants
on the ground that there is no case to answer. That remedy applies only on the
basis of the case presented by the prosecution. And the violation of human rights
in this case does not aﬀect the ability of the prosecution to put their case on the
charges laid against the defendants. Thirdly, it is true that a possible remedy
would have been to proceed with the trial and to reflect the violation of human
rights in the sentence which is imposed. But, in the light of the particular
violation in this case, namely, a breach of the right to the presumption of
innocence, to have proceeded with the trial on this basis would have left the
court open to the charge that it too was presuming the defendants guilty, thereby
committing another breach of the very right to the presumption of innocence,
since the remedy (reducing sentence) is only available if the defendants are
convicted. Therefore this was not a suitable remedy in this case. Finally, the
only other alternative remedy available, to dismiss the complaint “not on the
merits” or “without prejudice”, so that it does not have the eﬀect of an acquittal,
would have been a feeble response to what is a serious violation.
It is the gravity of the misconduct, in that it was a blatant and defiant violation
of human rights, that justifies the stronger remedy of, in eﬀect, an acquittal. Not
only was the violation in this case committed by the Procureur General, the
highest law enforcement oﬃcial in the relevant province, it was an infringement
of human rights which took place in defiance of a court order, that is to say,
under the “very nose” of the court, as the magistrate himself described it. By
his conduct, the Procureur General, the oﬃcial whose duty it is to enforce the
law, at once (a) disobeyed a court order, (b) deprived the defendants of their
liberty without lawful excuse, and (c) infringed their right to the presumption of
innocence. This is executive lawlessness of a most despicable kind. This point
did not escape the learned magistrate who observed that by their lawlessness,
the department of public prosecutions, headed by the Procureur General, had
turned themselves into “persecutors and not prosecutors”. It is clear that the
conduct of the Procureur General in this case directly threatened the very idea
77 Ibid. s. 286. See also The People v. Lekunze (2000) 1 CCLR 74; Injoku v. The People (1998) 1
CCLR 118; The People v. Pius Fusi (1968) WCLR 30.
78 Kusiduba v. The People (1998) 2 CCLR 234.
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of the rule of law and the whole concept of freedom in society. That is why the
magistrate took pains to emphasize the point “that this nation of Cameroon is
a state of law where the decision of a competent court, until reversed by a
superior court, stands and has the force of law”. It is submitted that the court
must take a firm stance against flagrant executive malpractice of this kind which
so directly threatens the rule of law. A criminal court can only do so by dismissing
the complaint on the merits.
A criminal court is not just concerned with the question whether or not the
defendant is guilty of the oﬀence charged. The judiciary, including a magistrate
in a criminal court, has a responsibility to maintain the rule of law and to refuse
to countenance executive malpractice and abuse of power which threatens basic
human rights or the rule of law.79 Therefore if it comes to the attention of the
court that there has been serious abuse of power by the department in charge
of public prosecutions, the court should express its strong disapproval by dismissing
the complaint on the merits. Two advantages may be gained from the use of
this remedy: (i) it should have the eﬀect of discouraging the department in charge
of public prosecutions and the police from engaging in similar misconduct in
the future and (ii) it would safeguard the moral integrity of the criminal process.
It is for this latter reason that the criminal court cannot simply turn a blind eye to
the violation of human rights by the department in charge of public prosecutions,
proceed with the trial, and leave the defendants to seek in the civil courts such
remedy against the department as may be available. The criminal process ought
not to proceed on the basis of such gross misconduct by those in charge of
public prosecutions.
Another reason which argues in favour of the remedy granted by the magistrate
is that, quite apart from the policy of deterrence or safeguarding the integrity
of the criminal process, where the violation amounts to a breach of the defendant’s
right to a fair trial, the proper remedy is to discontinue the proceedings. It
appears that in the context of the Charter a breach of the right to the presumption
of innocence necessarily involves a breach of the right to a fair trial under article
7(1). This seems to be the view taken by the magistrate in The People v. Nya
Henry. Hence once he found that there had been a violation of the right to the
presumption of innocence, he concluded that the trial could not continue. He
made it clear that “I will be doing no justice in this matter to call upon these
people to take a plea before me with the gross violation of their constitutional
and Human Rights”.
Damages in separate proceedings
Apart from or in addition to any remedy which the criminal court may grant,
an individual whose right under the Charter has been infringed may pursue a
free-standing claim in separate proceedings for damages against the public
authority alleged to have committed the violation. At this point it should be
recalled that the general rule in Cameroon is that only the administrative court
has jurisdiction in respect of claims for damages against public authorities.
Generally, the ordinary courts do not have jurisdiction to award damages against
public authorities. The position is of course diﬀerent in other systems of law. In
England, for example, by section 7(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998, a person
79 A similar approach has been adopted under English law in cases of pre-trial misconduct by
the police: R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Bennett [1993] 3 WLR 90.
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who claims that a public authority has violated his or her human rights80 may
bring proceedings against that authority in the appropriate court or tribunal.81
The expression “appropriate court or tribunal” means ordinary courts, so that
a claim under section 7(1)(a) may be brought either in the County Court or the
High Court,82 depending on the usual jurisdictional limit. So, where a criminal
court (Magistrates Court or Crown Court) has found that a public authority
acted in violation of the defendant’s human rights, a claim for damages could
be brought in separate civil proceedings before the ordinary civil courts (County
Court or High Court). In Cameroon, as in England, where a criminal court
finds that a public authority has acted in violation of the complainant’s human
rights, and the complainant seeks damages for that violation, he or she would
need to pursue separate civil proceedings for damages against the public authority.
But in Cameroon, the civil proceedings against a public authority may only be
brought in an administrative court, subject to the exception in section 9(4) of
the 1972 Ordinance which allows claims to be brought before the ordinary
courts in cases of administrative trespass and arbitrary action or voies de fait.
Therefore the defendants in the case of Nya Henry could have maintained a
separate civil claim for damages against the department of public prosecutions
in the Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court if the action of the Procureur
General was deemed to be an administrative act. But if, as is here submitted,
the illegality of the action in question is so flagrant and gross that it ceases to
be an administrative act, then the claim for damages should be against the
person acting as the Procureur General in his personal capacity. The action
may be brought in the ordinary civil court (Court of First Instance or High
Court) under the doctrine of voies de fait. In either case the court (whether the
administrative court or the ordinary civil court) would have to assess the amount
of damages recoverable. That will depend of course on the Charter right infringed
and the degree of the infringement.
In the case of the right to the presumption of innocence, the damages
recoverable should include (i) pecuniary loss suﬀered as a result of the violation,
(ii) non-pecuniary loss caused by the violation, and (iii) legal costs and expenses
incurred in attempting to secure redress for the violation. Pecuniary loss includes
the amount of fine by way of penalty imposed by the court as a result of the
conviction.83 It also includes loss of earnings, especially where, as in the case of
Nya Henry, the complainant was physically prevented from working by the
detention. But pecuniary loss is not limited to cases of physical detention. Loss
of earnings as a result of damage to business opportunities is also loss for
which compensation should be recoverable. In Allenet de Ribemont v. France84 the
complainant was awarded compensation for damage to his business opportunities
80 That is to say, the public authority has acted in a way which is made unlawful by s. 6 of the
Act.
81 In England it is said that this procedure is there to ensure that an individual can bring a claim
for the violation of human rights under the European Convention in instances where there is no
existing remedy available under domestic law which is capable of adaptation: B. Emmerson and A.
Ashworth, Human Rights and Criminal Justice, London, 2001, paras. 3–41.
82 Civil Procedure Rules, Rule 7.11.
83 Cf. Lingens v. Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407, where the European Court awarded a sum equivalent
to the fine and costs which had been awarded against the complainant in the criminal proceedings
against him.
84 (1996) 20 EHRR 557.
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as a result of statements which infringed his right to the presumption of
innocence.85
Non-pecuniary loss includes pain and suﬀering arising from unlawful
detention.86 The assessment of damages for non-pecuniary loss is of course more
diﬃcult. It is by no means clear how much should be awarded, for example, for
a day or week spent in unlawful detention. But the diﬃculty in the assessment
of these damages should not deter national judges who are accustomed to making
such assessments in common law cases of false imprisonment by the police.87
Thus a person who has been unlawfully detained by the police or the department
of public prosecutions so that his or her right under article 6 of the Charter has
been violated may be awarded non-pecuniary damages under national law.88 If
the claim is brought under the common law of false imprisonment then the
court should not award any additional sum by way of “human rights” or
“Charter” damages. The reason is because the right under article 6 of the
Charter appears to be co-extensive with the common law of false imprisonment.
Therefore the ordinary award for false imprisonment should provide an adequate
sum for the breach of article 6 of the Charter where the breach arises out of
the same circumstances.
Where the violation is established after the trial
In cases where the violation is established only after the trial, the options open
to the court are in practice limited, and they depend on whether the complainant
was convicted or not. Where the complainant was not convicted the only practical
remedy will be monetary compensation by way of damages.
Where the complainant was convicted, the conviction should be quashed if
the violation of the right to the presumption of innocence resulted in the violation
of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. It has been seen that under the European
Convention of Human Rights the breach of the right to the presumption of
innocence under article 6(2) will not necessarily result in an infringement of the
right to a fair trial under article 6(1). But, as has been suggested above, the
position is diﬀerent under the African Charter. Breach of the right to the
presumption of innocence under the Charter will always involve breach of the
right to a fair trial. If this view is correct, then if it is found that the complainant’s
right to the presumption of innocence was violated in proceedings in which he
or she was convicted, the conviction should be quashed, if the court has the
power to do so. In the Nya Henry case, where the breach of the right to the
presumption of innocence was found during a trial, the court held that the trial
could not in justice continue. If a trial ought not to continue because of a
85 In Bagetta v. Italy (1998) 10 EHRR 325 the European Court awarded compensation for the
financial loss suﬀered as a result of criminal proceedings which failed to be concluded within a
reasonable time.
86 Cf. in England, R. v. Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex p. Evans (No. 2) [1998] 4 All ER 993, damages
awarded to individuals whose release from prison was delayed beyond the lawful date.
87 In England, the Court of Appeal in Thompson v. Commissioner of Police [1997] 2 All ER 762 laid
down specific guidelines as to the levels of award which were appropriate for false imprisonment or
malicious prosecution to the extent of suggesting figures for each day of detention.
88 Art. 6 of the African Charter seeks to protect the same right which is protected under art. 5
of the European Convention. One diﬀerence between the two provisions is that the remedy of
monetary compensation is expressly provided for in art. 5(5) of the European Convention for a
violation of the right in art. 5.
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particular violation, then it is not too much to say that if the same violation is
found after trial the conviction should be quashed.
If the breach of the Charter is established at the level of a national court,
then if that court has power to quash the conviction it may do so. In Cameroon
the Court of Appeal has power to quash a conviction. It is submitted that the
same power can, and should, be used to quash a conviction where there has
been a breach of the right to a fair trial under article 7(1) of the African Charter.89
Where the case goes beyond the national courts and the violation is only
established at the level of the African Commission then the only practical and
eﬀective remedy may be damages in a free-standing action in a domestic court.
The African Commission, as has been seen, has no power to make any award
of damages against a State. It certainly has no power to make an order for a
conviction to be quashed. Even the European Court which has jurisdiction to
award monetary compensation under article 41 of the European Convention,
has no jurisdiction90 to quash a criminal conviction.91 The question is whether,
if a violation is established at the level of the African Commission, the complainant
could take that finding to a national court to have his conviction quashed. This
is a moot point which has not yet been tested in the Cameroonian courts. But
it is not immediately clear why this should be impossible. Even if it is beyond
the power of national courts to quash a conviction on the findings of the
Commission, the complainant should be able to use the findings to maintain a
civil claim for monetary compensation in the domestic courts as explained above.
C
The African Commission was established to protect human rights and ensure
their protection in Africa. But it is now widely acknowledged that the system of
redress through the Commission has failed to achieve that purpose. The inability
of the Commission to give an eﬀective remedy has meant that victims of human
rights abuse in Africa have for the most part looked no further than their national
courts for a remedy. Yet national judges have largely been unequal to the challenge
of providing a remedy where the alleged violation is by the administration. But
the disappointment which this occasions should not cause us to give up hope
altogether. There are a few but encouraging instances where national judges
have not been prepared to turn a blind eye to flagrant and serious human rights
violations by the administration.
This article has endeavoured to show, using the example of Cameroon, that
national courts sometimes have the formal power to provide redress where there
has been a breach of the African Charter. That for the most part they have not
done so is something which must be attributable to other reasons. Of these the
lack of judicial independence surely takes a prominent place.92 In some countries
89 In England, for example, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) has power to quash a
conviction where there has been a breach of the right to a fair trial under art. 6 of the European
Convention.
90 Art. 41 is in terms that if the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention,
“and the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be
made, the Court shall, if necessary, aﬀord just satisfaction to the injured party”.
91 Schmautzer v. Austria (1996) 21 EHRR 511, paras. 43–44.
92 The problem of lack of independence of the judiciary is one which can only be dealt with at
a wider political level as part of any constitutional arrangement for the separation of power between
the diﬀerent branches of state power.
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a judge who ventures to grant a remedy for human rights violations against the
administration in a politically sensitive case will be risking his or her career and
sometimes more. That is why it is worthwhile to record and celebrate the courage
of those few judges, like the magistrate in the Nya Henry case, who, in the face
of intimidation from the executive, are prepared to stand up for the rule of law
and the protection of human rights in Africa. It is to be hoped that the proposed
African Court of Human Rights will go much further than the Commission and
national courts in the protection of human rights in Africa through the provision
of an eﬀective remedy, such as monetary compensation. If that dream should
come true then at least some claimants who cannot obtain a remedy before
national judges who are under political influence will have somewhere else to
take their prayer for redress.
P
The problem of lack of independence of the judiciary in Cameroon is serious.
In his report on Cameroon, the UN Special Rapporteur identified this as one
of the factors which contribute to the poor state of human rights protection in
Cameroon.93 In the Nya Henry case the magistrate could not conceal the fact
that he was under pressure from the executive. He could see that at least his
career could be adversely aﬀected if he decided the case in a way which went
against the wishes of the executive.94 Thus he observed in his ruling that “those
who cherish the status of this country as a state of law should keenly follow up
the outcome of this case before the superior courts and, why not, any developments
in the career of this magistrate after this case”. On the first point, it can be
reported that the case has gone to the Court of Appeal.95 On the second point,
within months of the decision in Nya Henry the magistrate was removed from his
post and transferred to serve in the oﬃce of the Procureur General of the South
West Province.96 Magistrate Abednego observed in his ruling that “a Magistrate
in this our state of law is free to render . . . justice without fear or favour”.
Whether the development in his career after he rendered justice without fear or
favour confirms his view that in Cameroon a magistrate “is free” to do so is
perhaps a question on which views may diﬀer. But few would disagree with the
proposition that judicial independence is an essential requirement if the rights
enshrined in the Charter are to be enforced fully in domestic courts.
93 Report of Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/2000/9/add.2), para. 71, where he recorded the
“general perception that judges and prosecutors were and considered themselves as oﬃcials of the
Ministry of Justice, and thus subject to the authority of the executive power.”.
94 That perhaps explains why he went out of his way to bring his decision to the attention of the
international community by ordering that the ruling be served, for their information, on (i) the
French Ambassador in Cameroon, (ii) the British High Commissioner in Cameroon, (iii) the
Ambassador of the United States of America in Cameroon, (iv) the UN Commission for Human
Rights, (v) Amnesty International and (vi) Transparency International.
95 A few days after the complaint was dismissed, the defendants were in fact released.
96 This kind of sanction is apparently not uncommon in Francophone states. In Senegal, for
example, Judge Kandji, the judge who took the courageous decision to indict Hissene Habre´, the
former Head of State of Chad in a landmark case, was quickly transferred from his post as chief
investigating judge of the Dakar Regional Court to become assistant state prosecutor at the Dakar
Court of Appeals. This transfer happened after Habre´’s lawyer in the case became Senegal’s Minister
of Justice. See I. Sansani op. cit. n. 12 at 34.
